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contested concept itself. I see Schaffer as engaged in positiv-
istic empirical research. His long discussion about what “fam-
ily” means in different cultures is meant to be an accurate
representation of these differences.
So Schaffer and I agree on many points dealing with the
semantics of concepts. We part ways on the role of concepts
in describing the world and their use in explaining how the
world works. His book stresses the value of understanding
how people use concepts and what they mean by various
concepts. But concepts have an instrumental value as well.
We can ask how well they describe the world and if they are
useful in explaining the world.
The biggest difference between us lies in the role of expla-
nation, causation, and causal hypotheses. I am interested in
concepts because they are essential in describing the world,
but also very much because they are core to explaining the
world. This of course makes me a “positivist,” but some
interpretivists also want to explain the world.5 Causal explana-
tion is the goal of my main target group, social scientists, and
is my goal in my substantive work. I work from the philosophy
that high quality concepts are critical to high quality social
science. Bad concepts, e.g., terrorism, lead to bad research. A
very big chunk of my applied work over the years involves
very serious conceptual analysis. Before I can explain interna-
tional peace I needed to think very hard about the concept of
peace.6 To analyze how people, say Wolofs in Gambia, differ in
their concept of democracy, is interesting to me if that some-
how “matters.” Mattering is that it influences behavior or is
influenced by something. These are causal questions. I am
interested in differences in meaning and concepts, but only
those that somehow matter in causal explanations, hypoth-
eses and theories.
The title of Schaffer’s book indicates that it is about “so-
cial science” concepts. To advance social science we need to
know how interpretivist methodologies of concepts help or
relate to causal explanations and hypotheses.
References
Foucault, Michel. 1972. Histoire de la folie à l’age classique. Paris:
Gallimard.
Goertz, Gary, Paul F. Diehl, and Alexandru Balas. 2016. The Puzzle of
Peace: the Evolution of Peace in the International System. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1974. “Persistence and Change in Political Sys-
tems 1800-1971.” American Political Science Review vol. 68, no.
4: 1482–1504.
Paxton, Pamela. 2000. “Women in the Measurement of Democracy:
Problems of Operationalization.” Studies in Comparative Interna-
tional Development vol. 35, no. 3: 92–111.
Paxton, Pamela, Kenneth A. Bollen, Deborah M. Lee, HyoJoung
Kim. 2003. “Problems of a Half-Century of Suffrage: New Data
and a Comparative Analysis.” Studies in Comparative Interna-
tional Development vol. 38, no. 1: 93–117.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and
5
 e.g., Wedeen 2002; Foucault 1972.
6
 Goertz et al. 2016. There are many war-conflict datasets, we
offer the first peace dataset.
Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political
Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Schaffer, Frederic. 2016. Elucidating Social Science Concepts: An
Interpretivist Guide. London: Routledge.
Wedeen, Lisa. 2002. “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Po-
litical Science.” American Political Science Review vol. 96, no. 4:
13–28.
Commanding a Clear View:
Words, Concepts, and Social Science
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson
 American University
To lay my cards on the table at the outset: I am broadly sympa-
thetic to Frederic Schaffer’s overall campaign in favor of con-
ceptual elucidation: “investigating the ways in which the so-
cial world is built up linguistically and the ways in which social
actors deploy concepts to pursue their goals.”1 On numerous
previous occasions I have been, like Schaffer, decidedly criti-
cal of scholarly efforts to “fix” the meaning of a concept (like
the West or civilization) and then to use that scholarly recon-
struction as a base from which to legislate appropriate and
inappropriate practical claims using that concept—as though
our task as scholars were to correct the social world rather
than to explain and understand it. So Schaffer’s careful explica-
tion of techniques for elucidation, grouped under the head-
ings of “grounding,” “locating,” and “exposing,” provides a
refreshing alternative to the sort of advice about concept analy-
sis one typically receives from scholars engaged in the kind of
project I think rather problematic.
That said, in my view Schaffer’s book also illustrates—
practically and performatively if not deliberately—an impor-
tant liability of his approach to concepts. The version of
“interpretivism” that emerges from his account, while grounded
in how people in the field conventionally use the word, ob-
scures rather than clarifies important philosophical distinc-
tions between theory, methodology, and method, and shores
up philosophically misleading but practically operative di-
chotomies opposing “interpretivism” to “positivism” as if those
were coherent intellectual packages. Despite conventional use,
I do not believe that “positivism” and “interpretivism” name
such coherent packages. For that reason I do not believe that
the only alternative to reconstructing a concept so that it can
be inserted into a statistical study as an independent or de-
pendent variable—which is the so-called “positivist” strat-
egy—necessarily means taking on all three of Schaffer’s “sets
of interpretivist questions”2 about ranges of meaning, linguis-
tic and historical specificity, and political context. By adhering
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too closely to contemporary scholarly convention, Schaffer
reproduces a simplified picture of our choices, and tacitly in-
sists that we choose a side. Despite his admirable caveat about
the book being “more akin to a collection of recipes written for
an adventurous cook,”3 the overall picture he paints is still
dichotomous.
The difficulties begin on the first page of the book, where
Schaffer introduces positivism and interpretivism as “two dif-
ferent conceptions of social science or, more precisely, two
different methodologies that the scholar may bring to the study
of the social world.”4 He takes positivism to be a stance about
the mind-independent existence of entities in the social world
(which we might call a mind-world dualism); this gives rise to
the task of formulating propositions “about those entities
based upon the identification and measurement of regularities
within and between them.” Interpretivism, by contrast, main-
tains that “there are no ‘real’ social entities, only culturally
mediated social facts,” and that this stance, which we might
call mind-world monism, means that the scholarly task is to
“shed light on how shared meanings and their relation to power
inform or structure the social world and the study of the social
world.”5 There is a lot crammed into this distinction: philo-
sophical ontology (also known as “methodology”)6 concern-
ing the hook-up between the mind and the world, scientific
ontology (also known as “theory”) concerning the character
of social entities and the nature of social action, and a series of
concrete research tasks that supposedly follow or flow from
those positions. Theory and methodology are also linked, al-
though the links are not made especially clear; we aren’t told
precisely why a commitment to mind-world dualism on the part
of the researcher both implies a task of looking for nomothetic
empirical generalizations and directs researchers away from
investigating the role of shared meanings.7 Nor are we told
why an appreciation of “culturally mediated social facts” means
that researchers have to prioritize the role of shared meanings
in their scholarly investigations.
In my view the ambiguity here arises from the conflation
of philosophically distinct registers with the unfortunate con-
sequence of disciplining thinking space into a binary either/or
choice between “positivism” or “interpretivism.” The two reg-
isters of theory and methodology speak to different aspects of
scholarly claims; the former concerns the content of a claim
about the world, while the latter concerns the status of that
3
 Schaffer 2016, xv.
4
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5
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claim. And they can in principle be combined in a variety of
different ways, despite the fact that we conventionally repro-
duce only certain combinations in our existing research prac-
tice. There is no philosophical problem at all involved in taking
the theoretical position that shared meaning shapes the world,
and simultaneously adopting a research strategy intended to
disclose systematic cross-case correlations between variations
in shared meaning and variations in social arrangements or
outcomes. Similarly, there is no philosophical problem at all
involved in taking the methodological position that scholarly
knowledge is not a representation of a putatively mind-inde-
pendent reality but is instead tightly co-constitutive of that
reality, and simultaneously adopting a theoretical perspective
that focuses on social structures or arrangements of practical
activity rather than on shared meaning.
What Schaffer identifies as “positivism” and “interpret-
ivism” are combinations of theory and methodology that are
not exhaustive of the combinatorial possibilities—and this
matters precisely because Schaffer’s discussion presumes, al-
beit tacitly, that they are exhaustive. One is either a “positiv-
ist” or an “interpretivist,” and the whole of each package has
to be accepted at the same time. His recommendation of three
aspects of conceptual elucidation does not entertain the pos-
sibility that a scholar might not engage in all three aspects, and
I submit that Schaffer cannot entertain that possibility be-
cause the menu of choices has been framed too dichotomously.
To elucidate a concept, in Schaffer’s account, requires
first grounding that concept in experience-near language (“com-
monplace words used in everyday contexts”8) by looking at
how ordinary people use terms in their everyday lives, and
then locating a term in its specific context to prevent a mis-
translation of the relevant conceptual category into something
in our vocabulary as though it seamlessly fit there. Grounding
and locating terms in this way provides knowledge of con-
cepts precisely because “a concept is constituted by the dif-
ferent ways in which a word is used,”9 and the scholar’s role is
to call attention to that diversity rather than to identify com-
monalities across uses and contexts.
Why? Schaffer provides two broad answers, one involv-
ing criticizing concepts that “have become stabilized, natural-
ized, or neutralized in ways that obscure from view their histo-
ries of contingency and contestation,”10 and the other involv-
ing an effort to make certain that scholarly concepts corre-
spond to the concepts in use among the people being studied:
“we would need to know who each voter considers to be a
member of his or her family in the context of ballot casting” in
order to determine whether family members influence one
another’s votes.11 Both of these ends reflect a skepticism about
universals and a desire to provincialize scholarly discourse: if
scholarly concepts are just one set of conventional uses of
terms, there is no compelling reason to prefer the scholarly
concepts over those operating in the contexts under investi-
8
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gation. We are thus enjoined to look at language-in-use in our
explanatory theories, presumably because to do otherwise
would be to commit the same sin that Sartori commits when he
advances an abstract concept of the family designed to travel
across contexts: “he reifies a particular and partial conception
of what a family is” and thus “risks guiding in unexamined
ways the thinking of anyone who adopts such a definition.”12
Sticking close to how people themselves use terms is the anti-
dote to such a scholarly imposition.
But all of this makes very specific assumptions about the
purpose and potential of scholarship. Knowledge about how a
group of people conventionally uses a term might suffice as an
explanation of an outcome if we had a theoretical reason for
connecting conventional uses and outcomes—but such a con-
nection is not an inevitable consequence of the close examina-
tion of conventional use per se. But the connection between
conventional uses and outcomes is a consequence of the re-
jection of “positivism” understood as a more or less behavior-
ist quest for systematic correlations. The implicit argument
seems to be that if we are to take people’s conventional uses of
terms—their concepts—seriously, then we have no choice but
to restrict scholarly explanation to an exercise of explication:
an outcome or arrangement is explained when we disclose the
concepts in terms of which that outcome is comprehensible to
the people involved. In such a conception, operational con-
cepts can’t be wrong, and people can’t be mistaken. It is diffi-
cult to see how we might explain a situation as produced by
something people were doing without meaning to do it. People
also cannot be unaware of the reasons for which they do things,
affected by factors that lie outside of their conceptual uni-
verses. It is also unclear how a scholar might critique con-
cepts, whether her own or those of the people under investiga-
tion, except by bringing to light their false universalism; there
does not seem to be much space here for anything like a better
concept.
Many of these criticisms likely sound like the sort of thing
a “positivist” might deploy against an “interpretivist,” since in
Schaffer’s account those are the only alternatives. I do not
agree. We are not faced with a dichotomous choice between a
mind-world dualist strategy of producing universal concepts
that populate nomothetic generalizations and a mind-world
monist strategy of explicating diverse patterns of the conven-
tional use of terms that results in enhanced awareness of the
locality of meaning and a consequent privileging of the experi-
ence-near language of participants in our scholarly accounts.
We are instead faced with a series of choices involving differ-
ent philosophical registers, and a plethora of ways of making
good use of Schaffer’s excellent technical advice about a vari-
ety of methods of grounding and locating concepts. One can
act on Schaffer’s advice and pay attention to operational con-
cepts understood as terms in conventional everyday use for a
number of different reasons:
In the theoretical register, we might broadly distinguish13
between experience-near theories that focus on shared mean-
12
 Schaffer 2016, 14.
13
 Here I invoke a distinction explored in Jackson and Nexon (2013).
ings as an explanatory factor, and social-relational theories
that focus on patterns of transaction and the positions of ac-
tors relative to one another. The former would engage in
grounding and locating in order to make sense of the cultural
lifeworld of the actors being investigated, aiming to disclose
the situationally-specific rules of, for example, how compe-
tence is defined and negotiated in a diplomatic setting14 or
what makes for an acceptable public statement about foreign
policy15 or an acceptable course of action regarding sovereign
prerogatives.16 The latter would engage in grounding and lo-
cating in order to track how the deployment and invocation of
particular concepts generate outcomes, or how available con-
cepts are shaped by networks and specific histories; here the
emphasis is on sketching transposable mechanisms like bro-
kerage17 or legitimation18 and investigating how they play out
in specific cases. In a way, the former is more interested in the
content of a concept, while the latter privileges the form, either
of the overall conceptual space or of particular types of rhe-
torical deployment, and while the former aims to produce
“thick” locally specific knowledge, the latter aims to refine
“thin” ideal-typical mechanisms and processes that can in-
form singular causal accounts.19
In the methodological register, we might broadly distin-
guish20 between at least four different ways of producing so-
cial-scientific knowledge: subsuming outcomes under general
laws, identifying dispositional causal capacities, elaborating
ideal-typical models, and reflexively grounding claims in the
social position of the social scientist herself. Each of these
four approaches would have a use for concepts understood as
experience-near and grounded in conventional everyday us-
age, whether that was coding an operative meaning variable,
abductively inferring a condition of possibility for a way of
using terms, connecting the terms of a model to the local cul-
tural context of the scholar herself, or dispelling the white-
washed universality of assuming that every place and every
social situation is fundamentally identical and thus seamlessly
translatable into one’s own default native language.
Also operating in the methodological register, we might
broadly distinguish between descriptive knowledge intended
to communicate facts, causal knowledge intended to convey
the skills and capacities involved in making something hap-
pen, and a kind of knowledge intended to equip the recipient
to go on appropriately—a type of knowledge I would person-
ally prefer to call “interpretive,” with full awareness that this is
a considerably narrower use of the term than Schaffer might
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tioned in the previous paragraph, Schaffer’s techniques for
grounding and locating concepts can contribute to any of
these three kinds of knowledge: we could engage in locating
and grounding in order to answer questions about what some
group of people mean by some term (descriptive knowledge),
questions about which terms we might use ourselves in order
to provoke a particular response (causal knowledge), or ques-
tions about how to use terms properly as a member of the
community in question (in my lexicon if not in Schaffer’s, inter-
pretive knowledge).21
By breaking apart Schaffer’s “interpretivism” and “posi-
tivism” into a series of commitments in different philosophical
registers, we produce more thinking space, more possible com-
binations of substantive claims about the world and ways of
evaluating those claims. We also disrupt the false dichotomi-
zation that would invariably connect examinations of how terms
are used in practice with particular theories and methodolo-
gies, to the exclusion of other combinations. There is nothing
whatsoever about studying how people use terms that com-
mits us to any particular kind of theory or flavor of methodol-
ogy. Looking at the everyday use of terms in order to ground
and locate concepts does not lock us into theories that con-
nect shared meaning to outcomes or obligate us to eschew
causal explanations in favor of something like “understand-
ing.” The fact that many self-proclaimed “interpretivists” do in
fact combine a focus on everyday language with a rejection of
causation does not mean that the combination itself forms
some kind of seamless and compelling logical whole.
Indeed, moving beyond the “positivist”/”interpretivist”
dichotomy makes it possible to articulate an approach to con-
ceptual analysis that avoids the problems of objectivism, one-
sidedness, and false universalism, which Schaffer rightly criti-
cizes,22 but also serves causal-explanatory purposes. Such an
approach might involve using the precise grounding and lo-
cating of concepts not so much to “destabilize” putatively
“timeless, essential properties”23 as to show the relatively
stable patterns that emerge in the course of actual lived expe-
rience. Ideal-typifying such patterns would allow us to inves-
tigate how situated social actors deploy terms and the con-
cepts they carry with them, and how such deployments pro-
duce outcomes: through processes of legitimation, boundary-
creation and boundary-maintenance, and the foreclosing of
otherwise-possible courses of action. Proceeding in this way
means that the patterns of use that figure into the resulting
causal account are only analytical instruments; their apparent
“universality” is only a logical generality, and not any kind of
21
 Knowledge that criticizes particular concepts is also interpretive
knowledge in the sense I am using the term here: our use of our
concepts to critique what some other group is doing is an interpreta-
tion of their actions through the lens of our concepts and thus tell us
how to go on in our community. Our use of our concepts to clarify
what we ourselves ought to be doing is an interpretation of our own
context that tells us how to go on in our community (as in Wittgenstein
1953). All of these are variants on the problem of how to use terms
properly as a member of a community.
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a categorical pronouncement about the essence of a concept
or its limitless empirical applicability. And although an ideal-
typified notion is by definition24 “one-sided,” this is what we
might call a tactical one-sidedness for the purpose of explain-
ing a specific outcome: what is extracted from lived experience
are the broad outlines of how the group being investigated
actually uses the relevant terms, and this is done not in order
to elucidate one or another dimension of how a concept might
be defined, but to explain how this outcome arises from this
conventional use.
Ideal-typification thus provides a potential response to
two of the problems Schaffer identifies: universality and one-
sidedness. As for “objectivism,” another problem he identi-
fies, Schaffer worries that treating concepts in anything but an
“interpretivist” way means that scholarly treatments of a con-
cept present “a seemingly value-free, objective definition that
appears to be generated by a purely analytic set of operations
(identifying essential properties, etc.) and detached from a
broader context of political contestation.”25 This might be the
case if we were talking about scholarship that intended to
define a concept, and thus to tell audiences both inside and
outside of the academy precisely what something means. But
I very much doubt that this is the intent of much social-scien-
tific scholarship, and I would argue that it shouldn’t be our
intent when we are operating as social scientists or as any
other kind of scientist. Our job—our vocation—when operat-
ing in a scientific idiom is to produce well-reasoned conclu-
sions about matters of fact: descriptions and explanations that
are systematic, public, and worldly insofar as they bracket the
realms of the divine and the transcendent in order to focus on
producing “disenchanted” accounts.26 So I, as a social scien-
tist, should never be pronouncing judgment on what, for ex-
ample, “democracy” is; rather, I should be using a precisely
defined notion of “democracy” in my descriptions and expla-
nations, and explicitly refraining from using that definition to
legislate appropriate and inappropriate use by others. In that
way, a better awareness of the limits of the social-scientific
enterprise functions to disrupt “objectivism,” and in so doing
can address Schaffer’s concerns.
Of course, I am very aware that the philosophical limits of
social-scientific inquiry are often blurred in practice, as politi-
cal and social actors either look to scholarly definitions as
guidelines for their own thinking, or deploy scholarship as
part of a campaign to produce one or another practical out-
come. Sometimes we scholars even aid and abet that process.
Regardless, my point is that the problems of “positivism” that
Schaffer identifies are not, in my view, philosophical problems
so much as they are institutional and political problems. I think
that Schaffer is quite correct that we can start to address these
problems by bringing our technical language “back to the
rough ground,” as Wittgenstein might put it,27 and regarding it
as nothing other than ordinary language in a specific con-
24
 By Weber’s 1999 definition.
25
 Schaffer 2016, 19.
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text.28 But I disagree that the only important contribution that
grounding and locating scholarly concepts can make is to re-
activate histories of contestation and make us aware that our
scholarly notions do not drop intact from some rationalist
heaven. Even if some of us need to be reminded of that from
time to time, I very much doubt that pointing to past and ongo-
ing social contestation about the meaning of a concept is go-
ing to do the trick. In my view, reflexive critique of our own
scholarly concepts should start by clarifying how we as social
scientists are supposed to use concepts—and that in turn comes
from (to invoke Wittgenstein again) an investigation of our
own “form of life” intended not to explain outcomes, but to
normatively prescribe ways of appropriately “going on.” If we
did that, in my view, we would be in much better shape to
contribute to ongoing conversations in a complex and turbu-
lent world.
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A Few Words about Methodology
Frederic Charles Schaffer
 University of Massachusetts, Amherst
In mulling over how to most productively respond to the re-
flections offered by Lahra Smith, Gary Goertz, and Patrick Jack-
son, I tried to place myself in the armchair of a Qualitative &
Multi-Method Research reader. What big methodological ques-
tions, I asked myself, are raised by their reviews of my book?
How might I weigh in, generatively, on those questions?
One distinctive feature of this newsletter is that it pro-
vides a forum for political scientists of diverse methodological
commitments to speak to one another. It serves as a platform
for thinking together (and sometimes arguing against one an-
other) about what those epistemological and ontological com-
mitments are and how they matter. One area on which all three
contributors and I agree is that such commitments matter for
how we work with concepts. There is less consensus among
us on how to characterize those underlying methodological
differences, so it is on this question that I will mostly focus in
this response.
My own view is that it makes sense to distinguish, broadly,
two loose communities of scholars who hold different clusters
of methodological commitment. Here is how I describe those
commitments in Elucidating Social Science Concepts:
A widely shared methodological commitment of positiv-
ism, as I understand it, is a belief that social scientists can
directly and neutrally observe a social world that is made
up of entities (like families and classes and revolutions)
that enjoy, or are treated as if they enjoy, a real existence
independent of how people think of them. The aim of much
positivist inquiry is, correspondingly, to formulate propo-
sitions about those entities based upon the identification
and measurement of regularities within and between them.
An interpretivist approach to social science, in contrast,
usually starts from the dual premises that there are no
“real” social entities, only culturally mediated social facts,
and that social science is always perspectival and en-
twined with the pursuit of moral or material goals. The aim
of much interpretivist inquiry, consequently, is to shed
light on how shared meanings and their relation to power
inform or structure the social world and the study of the
social world.1
I hedge so many of these claims (“much,” “usually,” etc.) be-
cause I think that there is a good deal of diversity in what
scholars actually think and do. Again from my book:
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